Lock Picking as an Investigative Blind Spot
Recognizing Unauthorized Non-Destructive Entry During Criminal Investigations
Author: Pat Watson
Abstract
Lock picking or other Covert Methods of Entry (CMOE) are not reported or tracked within the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, resulting in a crime trend with an unknown frequency.
Even if a primary investigator on scene becomes aware that CMOE was used, the binary UCR choice of Force or No Force (F/N) is not necessarily clear, further skewing any chance at a CMOE crime trend becoming known, as well as hindering chances to combat CMOE related crimes.
Even if CMOE is suspected and might be helpful for investigative insight, officers and crime labs report that a Forensic Lock Assessment (FLA) to look for signs of CMOE is not a routine service that is provided, and an attempt to pursue that service has no clear route like DNA analysis, fingerprint analysis, etc.
The study of Operational Lock Forensics (OLF) is designed to not only determine if CMOE has taken place, but provides a depth of craft that can assist investigators by providing a wealth of information concerning the mechanics of a crime, can help identify suspects, and can help to improve the chances of prosecution.
Because there is no data on CMOE related crimes, and because investigators don’t have a system that can readily provide an FLA on a crime scene, a wealth of CMOE related evidence is never looked for, resulting in some crimes are slow to be solved, are not being solved at all, or not prosecuted correctly or at all.
Avenues exist for giving investigators and crime lab personnel the ability to rapidly and effectively provide a wealth of information if CMOE is suspected as a method of entry during burglaries, murders, or other types of crimes.
This paper recognizes the fact that CMOE involved crimes don’t represent a large percentage of criminal cases in the U.S., and this paper focuses on specific CMOE-related focus area cases: Cases that involve the implementation of CMOE at the crime scene, that are otherwise proving difficult or unable to be solved, and where a wealth of CMOE related evidence is present but overlooked, and that CMOE evidence would have a positive impact on the speed of identifying suspects, detaining suspects, assisting in suspect interviews, and increasing the speed of prosecution, the likelihood of prosecution, and a correct prosecution.
This paper is delivered with a focus on domestic American law enforcement investigators, but the content applies to investigators at every military and government agency. For example, military special forces operators might find themselves operating out of an isolated secure site in a foreign country and routine operational lock forensics (OLF) assessments performed on their own secure sites may reveal an attempted (or successful) CMOE intrusion by enemies who otherwise would not have had their actions discovered.
Keywords
Covert methods of entry (CMOE); lock forensics; lock picking; non-destructive entry (NDE); forensic locksmithing; burglary investigation; crime scene investigation; toolmark examination; forensic science; absence of forced entry.
Introduction
For law enforcement, military, and other government investigators, identifying the method of entry into a structure or space is a routine part of basic investigatory efforts. The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), provides guidance for how crimes are reported across the U.S. When submitting crime reports, investigators place “method of entry” into only two categories: “F” for Force or “N” for No Force observed (some report writing software will offer secondary selection items after this first choice). The information needed for this binary choice is usually obtained quickly and done via simple observations or a simple line of questioning.
These two options (F/N) are not necessarily intuitively defined. If officers select the wrong option, or if they incorrectly assume the definitions of these two options, it can skew the reported crime statistics in the UCR program for the type of CMOE focus area cases that this paper focuses on. Additionally, the surface-level layman’s understanding of “Force” likely relates to "destructive force,” and the layman’s understanding of “No Force” likely relates to “No damage seen, must have been unlocked,” and these two layman’s definitions don’t leave a clear place for CMOE, which is a collection of methods that actively unlock doors but without leaving any easily identifiable marks and without using destructive force - CMOE is neither "a door left unlocked" or "a door destructively entered."
Some crimes are in fact committed through the use of covert methods of entry (CMOE). Consider the familiar "locked room" murder where a victim is discovered inside a room with the door appearing to be locked from the inside. If investigators don’t consider the possibility of CMOE (which may allow a door to be locked shut from the outside without a key), or if they don’t know what CMOE evidence looks like, they may overlook important evidence which could either slightly, or severely hinder a case. It is easy to overlook the possibility that CMOE was used, and it is easy to take the search for CMOE evidence off the table if your report writing software requires you to select (in layman’s terms) whether you observed signs of destructive entry or whether the structure was already unlocked. If a case is proving difficult to solve, and if CMOE was used, overlooking this evidence could have a negative impact on the investigation.
The absence of visible signs of forced entry should never be treated as evidence that no unauthorized entry occurred. Instead, investigators should, at a minimum, ask a series of basic investigative questions to assess and, where appropriate, rule out the possibility of CMOE or other types of unauthorized non-destructive entry.
Image above: The photo shows the faces of two pins from a pin tumbler lock, the surfaces that contact the key when it is inserted, viewed under a small desktop microscope. Both pins came from the same lock after 3,000 openings with the correct key. The pin on the left shows only normal key wear. The pin on the right shows additional wear after a single beginner-level CMOE attack known as “raking,” using a pick and tension wrench.
If on scene investigators aren’t able to identify CMOE toolmarks, and they don’t know how to categorize CMOE as a method of entry (F/N), and if CMOE is not tracked as crime statistic data, and if on scene investigators don’t know how to pursue a Forensic Lock Assessment (FLA) even if they want to, and if laboratory personnel aren’t familiar with how they would perform an FLA, then we are existing in an environment with multiple investigative gaps. The failure to shore up these gaps will result not only in an untrackable crime trend taking place, but in victims not receiving closure, offenders not receiving justice, and in criminals continuing to injure people and property due to the existence of these investigative gaps.
For the purpose of this paper, the term investigator will refer to almost all persons involved in any on scene actions regardless of specific titles like police officer, tactical officer, government agent, etc., unless otherwise stated.
Why This Paper Exists
During the past two decades of working alongside, teaching, consulting, and speaking with thousands of law enforcement investigators from a wide range of agencies, a recurring observation has emerged for the author: an overwhelming majority of investigators have reported that they have never considered CMOE as an investigative avenue when determining how a suspect may have made entry. If the observation from these reports is representative, an important question follows: How many investigations have been slow to solve, or unsolved, due to a lack of awareness or training in CMOE investigative options? The available data cannot answer that question. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to conclude that the true number is zero.
Hobby lock picking in the US is a well established field of practice that the public has full access to:
The Open Organisation of Lockpickers maintains an up to date list of the legal status for the possession of lock picking tools for all 50 U.S. states; currently lock pick possession is legal in all 50 US states (TOOOL 2026).
Many retail websites exist that sell lock picking tools for low costs and with no regulation or prerequisites for sales.
TSA specifically lists “lock picks” by name as items that are allowed within carry-on bags, as well as within checked baggage (TSA 2026).
Social media platforms like YouTube, and others, have hundreds of hours of free training videos concerning how to pick locks. One YouTube channel, LockPickingLawyer, currently has 4.67 million subscribers as of 2026 (LockPickingLawyer 2026).
And TV shows like NCIS, Dexter, and even the cartoon Bob’s Burgers feature lock picking in multiple episodes across multiple seasons as a reoccurring event portrayed in the shows (LockWiki 2026).
With these current environmental factors in the U.S., it is possible that there already exists a growing crime trend where criminals have started switching from crimes of opportunity (doors left unlocked, and basic destructive entry), to strategic crimes that can be carried out with some of the more basic and easily acquired, or even advanced, skills that CMOE has to offer.
In the early 2000’s, Japan saw a sharp increase in lock picking-related crimes. In 1999, lock-picking was a method of entry for 25% of burglaries in one of the reporting regions, and only four months into the year 2000 CMOE accounted for 50% of crimes (The Japan Times 2003). If Tokyo reported 6,111 lock picking related crimes in 1999, and if we grant that Tokyo is one of three major metropolitan areas in Japan, that gives an estimate of 18,333 lock picking related crimes Japan-wide in 1999. With the factors listed above concerning the popularity, legality, and ease of access that the American public has for the field of lock picking, we can assume that lock picking, as a practiced skill, is more popular in the U.S. in modern times than it was in Japan in 1999, thus making our comparison estimate here even more generous. If Japan is roughly the size of the U.S. state of California (ignoring its population), and if we count California, Texas, Florida, and New York as four states that all have multiple large metropolitan areas, we can estimate (on a very generous low-end estimate) that 73,332 lock picking related crimes are occurring in the U.S. every year, unreported as far as a method of entry. If this is anywhere near representative in scale, lock picking should at least garner a basic level of awareness at a fair number of law enforcement agencies within each state, and even at a national level.
In 2020, the Israeli police reported 8,875 burglaries. For 35% of these burglary cases forensic investigators were unable to find any visible evidence of a method of entry at the scene. For the burglaries that were a part of this crime trend, forensic investigators were only able to identify and catch roughly 5% of perpetrators. Israel, in 2022, found another spike in a similar trend of burglaries where no signs of entry were found by investigators. Victims of many of these burglaries reported leaving their apartments and locking the doors, and returning home to find their door unlocked but with the lock in working order. Initial investigators and initial forensic personnel report that they could not find any useful information to help solve the crimes. Follow-on burglaries resulted in criminals being caught in the act in possession of CMOE tools for a technique (foil impressioning) that was unknown to law enforcement at the time. Investigators were forced to look outwards and to expand their investigations by looking at forensic evidence from other related burglaries. Lock forensics were eventually utilized, along with traditional forensics, resulting in the capture of the suspects for the cases involved in this particular crime trend (Pertsev 2024).
The quest to find academic or professional papers that provide any CMOE related crime data in the U.S., at all, has not been fruitful. The FBI compiles data from approximately 19,000 law enforcement agencies across the US, which includes burglary data, and that burglary data does include the distinction between burglaries where the method of entry involves “Force” and burglaries involving “No Force.” The FBI publishes crime data every year which includes total burglaries reported, and a breakdown of burglaries committed where the method of entry was “Force” and where the method of entry was “No Force.” But, it appears that there is no publicly available data from the FBI concerning how often lock picking was used as a method of entry. During the writing of this paper, to confirm, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) office was contacted via email, and their emailed reply confirmed “Lock picking as a method of entry during a burglary is not something that is collected” (FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program, email message to author, September 15, 2026).
While it has proven difficult to find any data concerning lock picking related crimes, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) published a report of burglary data spanning 2003-2007, which interviews a sampling of people across the U.S. and documents their self-reported answers concerning residential burglaries. This report states that in between 2004 and 2007 there was an annual average of 63,620 burglaries per year where the homeowner of a burglary to a residence reported that entry was made via a picked lock. The report also lists an annual average, within those years, of 418,410 methods of entry combined between “unknown means through locked door or window,” “by other means,” and “don’t know” (BJS 2010). So, in the years 2004-2007, it is possible that the actual number of burglary crimes involving CMOE is much greater than an average of 63,620 per year. It is also important to keep in mind that this BJS report only compiles data from interviews with residents concerning self-reported burglary details. Another question that begs an answer is the lack of available data concerning how many other crimes besides burglaries involve, or potentially involve, CMOE.
This paper exists because over the past 20 years, there has been an expansion of lock picking as a hobby that the public has full access to, and most investigators are unaware or underprepared to explore CMOE in the course of their investigations. Continued research into the state of CMOE awareness in the US, including forensics, continues to support the idea that there is a lack of CMOE awareness and CMOE-related capabilities for investigators.
What a "Forensic Lock Assessment (FLA)" Can Tell Investigators
A picture perfect Forensic Lock Assessment (FLA) example would be for an investigator on the scene of a crime to see specific CMOE evidence in plain sight, and to instantly know which specific tool (or which class of tools) was likely to have left said evidence, and then to find a matching CMOE tool on a suspect close to the time and location of the crime, to use knowledge of the method of entry to assist in questioning a suspect, resulting in a speedy and accurate conclusion to a case.
Operational Lock Forensics (OLF) is the study and the application of forensic skills relating to CMOE that investigators and tactical operators can apply on scene, or on deployment, with limited resources, outside of laboratory environments.
Image above: A deadbolt from a residential front door, extended out while the door is partially open, revealing four toolmarks that are consistent with a “deadbolt walking” CMOE technique.
Burglary investigators will be familiar with “crime trends” where several crimes are committed with the same operational signature, in the same area, within the same timeframe. Law enforcement investigators who are experienced interviewers will immediately know how to leverage, in interviews with suspects, the fact that specific CMOE evidence was found on one (or multiple) structures where a crime was committed along with the fact that a matching tool was found with the suspect. It is important to note that on scene FLAs, that result in insight relating to CMOE, can help to steer an investigation. Then, higher-end, in-depth scientific laboratory testing can help to shore up a much more solid prosecution.
Image above: The latch from a simple residential front door, showing normal wear patterns after more than 1,000 routine openings (highlighted in green), followed by evidence from a single CMOE attack using a “latch slipping” technique with a “traveler’s hook” tool, expertly applied with a light touch (highlighted in red).
OLF experienced investigators will also be able to make an educated guess as to the skill level of the person who attempted CMOE. They might be able to make a guess as to how long the specific entry took, and how loud the technique would have been. This can help when questioning victims and potential suspects, as well as starting to narrow down suspect profiles. Investigators can also use OLF skills to help them to start focusing in on when a crime may have taken place if the exact time of the crime is unknown, and through which doors and locks an intruder may have attempted entry through.
Investigators with OLF experience will also be able to look at a locking system, and the CMOE evidence on a lock or adjacent systems, and will be able to make an educated guess as to what a suspect may have searched on the internet to learn said techniques, a guess as to which retailers sell the types of tools in question, and might even be able to contact retailers directly and to ask them if they’ve recently sold those types of tools to anyone with a shipping address near the crime within a close date range to the crime.
OLF experience will also be able to give investigators a good idea of how long it takes an average person to learn different types of techniques. Some bypass techniques can be learned and employed in mere minutes as long as the entry person has the right tools and if the locking system is set up in a way that allows for a straightforward CMOE attack. Other techniques, for specific tools and specific locks, may take an average person many months to master, with extensive ongoing training taking place, along with participation on online forums which may even include all sorts of metadata that can identify potential suspects in the area of the crime. The higher security the lock is, the smaller the number of people there are on Earth that will be able to successfully pick that specific type of lock.
As an example, if a burglary, or even a murder, has taken place and was proving difficult to solve, and a door was clearly kicked in, allowing entry, a very valuable question that investigators would be asking people in the area is “Did you hear a door being kicked in, and if so, at what time did you hear that happen?” OLF experience can serve investigators in the same way “Did you see anyone taking pictures of the victim’s door or lock in the days preceding the crime? Did you ever see anyone kneeling down outside the victim’s door? If so, when?” If CMOE evidence for a specific lock is known to routinely take five to six minutes for experienced practitioners, but the area where entry was made has a lot of foot traffic every few minutes, this could help investigators narrow in a time window and can help ID a suspect as well as assisting in questioning potential witnesses in the area.
This is not an exhaustive list of what CMOE evidence can tell an investigator with OLF experience. Traditional investigative methods must still be relied upon in order to take a case to its final conclusion. But, if CMOE was used in the commission of a crime, and if an investigator has OLF certifications and experience, there are undoubtedly cases where the early identification of CMOE evidence, and the early application of the fruits of this evidence, can lead to a faster resolution and a more secure prosecution.
As a thought experiment, ask yourself if you’ve ever heard about any true crime cases that have stated “The victim must have died alone, since there were no signs of forced entry and the door was locked from the inside.” And ask yourself how the investigators might have (or might not have) proven that the lock was not picked open, or picked shut from the outside after the crime.
The Investigative Blind Spot
Most criminal investigations don’t involve criminals utilizing CMOE. According to a 2010 Special Report from the BJS, the report states that approximately 3.7 million burglaries occurred on average for each year between 2003-2007. This means that the victims of residential burglaries reported that lock picking was used in at least 1.7% of burglaries (BJS 2010). This makes it clear that most criminal investigations (at least residential burglaries) don’t ever require investigators to even be aware of the existence of CMOE as an investigative avenue. Even if CMOE is utilized as a method of entry into a locked space where a crime is then committed, it is still likely that investigators may solve the crime with strong interview techniques with victims and witnesses, and on the reliance of video evidence, or other types of traditional forensics evidence like fingerprints, DNA, and more. In these cases, even if CMOE evidence exists but is never found, documented, or discussed, the lack of proof for a method of entry may not have any effect on the apprehension of a suspect or prosecution, as long as other traditional investigative techniques are successful.
With a majority of modern law enforcement officers in the US reporting being understaffed, overworked, lacking on training, and handling large case loads that don’t allow individual cases the full breadth of investigative time they deserve, the last thing that investigators need is another mandatory checklist item that just serves to advise officers of a rare outlier possibility that may not end up being crucial to their cases. However, just a small change may be enough to spark investigators to explore this CMOE avenue for cases that are the focus of this paper: cases that are proving difficult to confirm that a crime has occurred, difficult to find a suspect, and cases where identifying CMOE as a method of entry and a forensic investigative route can speed up or increase the chances of closing the case with a speedy and accurate prosecution.
Investigators can benefit greatly from understanding: CMOE is used sometimes; it does leave evidence; and that evidence can speed up and otherwise support investigations.
5 Capability Gaps
Gap 1: Recognition - Most Investigators Don't Consider CMOE
The first of the five capability gaps identified in this paper concerns a lack of recognition for Covert Methods of Entry (CMOE) involvement in burglaries and other crimes. The idea of lock picking, or other CMOE, having occurred simply never crosses the minds of most investigators. The possibility of CMOE occurring during crimes is not something that is a widespread foundational concept applied or even discussed within most domestic law enforcement agencies within the US. In the author’s thousands of focused discussions with thousands of active and retired investigators that represent thousands of agencies, and not just the people taking part in the discussion but also the other people known to the interviewees, the phrase “this is how my agency is handling the CMOE problem” has never come up even once.
The BJS report mentioned above states that only 1.7% of victims of residential burglaries report lock picking as a method of entry for a burglary that has taken place at their residence; although the report doesn’t discuss the criticality of lock forensics during the investigating of these known CMOE involved burglaries, it is likely that a majority were solved via traditional investigation and traditional forensic measures (non-lock-related forensics). If roughly 1% of residential burglaries involve CMOE, and if most of those can be solved via traditional investigative routes, then there is no great need for a strong foundation of lock forensic knowledge or CMOE knowledge, and this paper recognizes this lack of need for most investigations.
CMOE, in the modern era, exists in almost all forms of media (music, tv shows, books, and movies, etc.), but it is rarely portrayed accurately. Many media portrayals make CMOE seem as though lock picking and other CMOE always works instantly and like magic. The media portrays CMOE as a skill relegated only to highly-trained covert operatives who have, presumably, received a large amount of high-level restricted training. If most investigators are not receiving training or certification in CMOE by their agencies, and if their only exposure to CMOE is via media (resulting in being uninformed, or misinformed), then it is unlikely that the field-applicable knowledge of CMOE will exist in the line of investigations.
In the author's personal experience, gained through service as a military operator, time spent as a law enforcement officer, and more than 20 years of practical lock-picking experience, structured discussions have been entered into with thousands of officers representing thousands of agencies where every discussion starts with at least three specific initial questions (further discussion then ensues).
For more than 20 years now, the same three introductory questions have always been asked:
Is anyone at your agency known to perform CMOE related tasks for your agency?
Of those persons, have they (or you) attended professional training courses or are they (or you) hobbyists/self-taught?
If they (or you) have received professional training, please describe the value that they (or you) report receiving from the course.
Typical answers from 20 years ago:
Approximately 1% of officers reported that an employee at their agency was available to respond to calls where lock picking was required.
Of those officers whose agencies had at least one investigator with a lock-picking capability, roughly half stated that the individual was a self-trained hobbyist who applied their lock picking hobby in support of agency operations, while the other half reported that the individual had received some type of formal training or certification.
Among agencies with personnel who had received formal training, officers almost exclusively reported that the training was very basic, not particularly thorough, and had occurred years earlier rather than recently.
Typical answers within the last five years:
Approximately 10% of officers with whom I have discussed CMOE have reported that their agency has at least one person on staff who is known to perform CMOE or other non-destructive entry (NDE) tasks in support of agency operations.
The reported certification breakdown remains similar: approximately half of these personnel are self-trained hobbyists employing those skills during work, while the other half have received some type of formal training.
Still, an overwhelming number of formally trained CMOE officers report that the training they received was mediocre in value.
If these reported findings from these three lines of CMOE questioning are anywhere near representative of the state of U.S. agencies involved in investigations, and 10% of these agencies have at least one person with a working knowledge of CMOE, and only half of that pool of known CMOE-capable personnel have attended structured training, and if a majority of that training has been reported as insufficient for an operational application, that results in an extremely small number of officers/investigators that would self-report as having a working knowledge of CMOE.
With most investigators having a skewed (or non-existent) view on what CMOE entails, and if investigators that do have CMOE skills report a less than desired amount of working knowledge of CMOE, it is unlikely for CMOE awareness to be leveraged in an operation or an investigation from most of the people carrying out routine operations or routine investigations.
There are a few very simple steps that can be taken in order to start bridging this recognition gap, all of them are minimally intrusive, short, simple, and cost effective:
Once per year, send out a very short, very basic email to all agency personnel that explains the possibility of CMOE being involved in crimes, the value that CMOE evidence can have if recognized early, and a recommendation to at least make a note in any investigative reports if CMOE may be suspected.
Select a position/title of personnel within your agency, maybe your agency’s Sergeants or Lieutenants or specific forensic laboratory personnel, and have a part of their once-per-year assessment include making contact with someone that is within their region who is capable of performing an FLA. One simple phone call, once per year.
Many people in the “lock studies” field love sharing their knowledge, and will often do so for free. Once your agency identifies a point of contact that is capable of FLAs, ask them if they are willing to give a presentation to a small group at your agency. Have your agency gather a small number of interested command staff and investigators to attend.
Gap 2: Reporting - Reporting Requirements and Report Writing Software are Unclear
Most law enforcement officers/investigators in the US who respond to residential burglaries are presented with only two options in their report writing software concerning the method of entry into the structure by the suspect: “Force” and “No Force”, F/N. Additionally, “force” is easily assumed to mean “destructive force.” CMOE is a non-destructive entry method which can lead to an incorrect classification (F/N) even if CMOE is observed or reported for the burglary. Next, after investigators make that binary F/N selection, most report writing software gives investigators some sub-categories to choose from for additional method of entry documentation including options to select like: a suspect entering through an open door or window, breaking a window, breaking through a door, and some others, but no clickable sub-category option is known to exist for “lock picked.”
If investigators are required to report only one simple observation of force or no force, and if these two categories are easily misunderstood, and if investigators are not given CMOE as an additional sub-category option, then investigators are existing within a report writing (and report taking) environment that does not prime investigators to look for signs of CMOE or to properly document CMOE. This can negatively impact the investigative progression of burglary cases involving CMOE. With a small change in report writing software, it is likely that cases involving CMOE will be solved better, faster.
In the U.S., the FBI gathers and analyzes domestic crime statistics from more than 19,000 agencies (FBI 2026). Most report writing software for domestic law enforcement agencies are designed to take into account the categories that align with the FBI’s uniform crime reporting (UCR) ecosystem. This means that when an officer opens a new case in their report writing system for a burglary (or other crime involving entry into a space) they must choose one of two options: either the investigator has observed signs that the suspect made forced entry into a space, or the investigator did not see any signs of forced entry.
For the uniform reporting of crimes in the US, multiple report writing software systems require investigators of burglaries this simple one-word or two-word option choice between “Force” or “No Force.” The FBI’s National Incident-Based Reporting User Manual, 2025.0, states: “For all Burglary offenses, the agency should report the method of entry in Data Element 11 (Method of Entry) as either data value F = Force or N = No Force” (FBI 2025. 22). This highlights a few problems. The first problem is that an initial investigator, for instance a patrol officer taking a primary report of a burglary involving CMOE (unbeknownst to the officer), is likely to look at those two choices in their report writing software in layman’s terms and to assess whether the investigator observed physical signs of damage or superficial cosmetic disturbances that assisted a suspect in making entry, or to assess that no signs of any method of entry were observed. This leaves the investigator to have to choose “F” if they observe physical evidence, or “N” if they observe no evidence of any type of entry occurring because no signs were seen.
A second problem is that if an investigator decided to continue reading through that same 192 page manual from 2025, they would find the definition of the “F/N” option: “For all Burglary offenses, the agency reports the method of entry in Data Element 11 (Method of Entry) as either data value F = Force or N = No Force. A forced entry occurs when the offender(s) uses force of any degree or a mechanical contrivance of any kind (e.g., a passkey or skeleton key) to unlawfully enter a building or other structure. An unforced entry occurs when the offender(s) achieves unlawful entry without force through an unlocked door or window” (FBI 2025, 22).
The FBI’s Summary Reporting System (SRS) User Manual, last published in 2013, states in their section on Burglary–Forcible Entry (5a) that:
Law enforcement classifies Burglary—Forcible Entry (5a) as all offenses where force of any kind is used to unlawfully enter a structure for the purpose of committing a theft or felony. This definition applies when a thief gains entry by using tools, breaking windows, forcing windows, doors, transoms, or ventilators, cutting screens, walls, or roofs, and where known, using master keys, picks, unauthorized keys, celluloid, a mechanical contrivance of any kind (e.g., a passkey or skeleton key), or other devices that leave no outward mark but are used to force a lock. Agencies also include burglary by concealment inside a building followed by exiting the structure as burglary. (Federal Bureau of Investigations 2013, 44)
Neither the newer NIBR manual from 2025, or the older SRS manual from 2013, provide a definition for “passkey” or “skeleton key.” But, the SRS from 2013 does specifically guide investigators to include in F (Force) “or other devices that leave no outward mark but are used to force a lock” (FBI 2013). This 2013 extended definition highlights a strange catch-22; how is an investigator supposed to know if a CMOE tool, leaving no outward marks, was used?
One short answer is that a suspect may be in custody and already questioned, and admitting to using CMOE. Or, a victim or witness may have seen the entry attempt, or captured the entry on video. However, this paper is aimed at assisting agencies with those cases that involve CMOE as a method of entry, that don’t currently have a suspect in custody, and for cases that are proving difficult to solve or to prosecute, and especially cases that would benefit from the wealth of data that CMOE evidence can tell investigators to assist them in speeding up or solving their cases. For these focus area cases, it is likely that “N” No Force will be selected, which would be incorrect according to the FBI’s guidance, and this may hamper investigative methods since secondary investigators are likely to follow the path that the primary investigators have set as “no signs of any entry were observed,” which is easily rephrased or understood in layman’s terms as “signs of entry methods don’t exist.”
If we start with the assumption that report writing software requires a choice between an ambiguous F or N, then that does not place investigators into an encouraging environment to solve the question: “Is it possible that CMOE was used?”
This F/N report writing environment can have a negative impact on the path that these CMOE focus area investigations follow. Any additional investigators that become involved in a case, after the initial report is written and after the initial scene is assessed, are likely to assume that the initial report writer has correctly selected F/N in their report writing software and that any noteworthy evidence concerning methods of entry have been documented within the report. Especially for these CMOE focus area cases, investigators are unlikely to go back and to look closely to double check and reassess signs of the methods of entry until “traditional” investigative methods have failed to provide a solution to the case.
If the forensic information contained within a lock or on lock related hardware is not assessed until time has been allowed to pass, there are real objective losses that a case can suffer:
If locks and related hardware are placed back into normal operation after an initial scene assessment is made, important and useful evidence within the locks may be “written over” as new toolmarks and other types of usage evidence is applied to the locking systems, which can result in the evidence disappearing or at least losing its clear identifiable value.
If a structure has its crime scene status removed and is back in normal use, especially for a burglary, murder, or similar crime, the owner or tenant may change the locks out entirely and/or dispose of the current locking systems in favor of brand new locks, resulting in the disposal of evidence within the locks.
Even if the forensic evidence within a lock or on a locking system remains present and undisturbed, if the scene/structure is released from a crime scene status and placed back into normal usage, and investigators later go back and find important and useful CMOE evidence, the chain of custody, and likewise the courtroom validity and strength of that evidence, loses much of its value.
If CMOE evidence is not identified at all, or even if it is not identified fast enough, for these CMOE focus area cases where a suspect is difficult to identify or to detain, this time gap allows the suspect to increase their time and distance away from the crime scene, and potentially allowing them to flee to another jurisdiction, making it more difficult or even impossible to prosecute the offender.
In order to make the smallest of changes that could have a beneficial impact on the report taking and report writing concerning cases that involve, or might involve, CMOE, it is recommended that only two small passive changes are implemented into report writing software. The first recommended change is that the binary F/N option can still remain but a clear, modern, and easily understood definition between the two can be displayed within a pop-up window or a floating box when an investigator is choosing between the two options. This should add lock picking and other CMOE methods of entry into the “Force” option which is likely to have two impacts: the first impact is that investigators will now be shown that “lock picking and similar methods of entry do exist, be on the lookout,” and the second impact is that if CMOE occurs and an investigator does observe said evidence then it can be documented in the correct binary F/N option for proper FBI UCR tracking.
The second small passive change recommended is that CMOE be added (and defined on screen) as a selectable option for the sub-classification of method of entry alongside existing options like smashing a window, breaking down a door, etc. This small change actually has a huge beneficial impact on the entire nationwide law enforcement environment. Currently, the FBI’s UCR program tracks statistics of the binary F/N option from the 19,000 agencies that it received data from, but does not track lock picking methods of entry as its own researchable sub-category crime statistic. It is difficult, or even impossible, to respond to a specific crime trend when zero data exists concerning the existence of said trend. Firmly planting this CMOE method of entry data classification into report writing software, and within the FBI’s UCR program, will make it more likely that investigators are looking for CMOE evidence, and will make it more likely that if CMOE evidence is observed that it is properly documented in reports and sent to the FBI via UCR data for future research and to assist in strategic problem solving concerning this unique method of entry.
These two implementations allow investigators the most minimal change in their routine report taking and report writing processes while allowing them to holistically ask themselves, victims, suspects and witnesses, questions that might steer them towards calling in an expert to assess the locking mechanisms and related hardware at the scene of the crime.
Gap 3: Procedure - Even if CMOE is Suspected by Investigators, What Can They Do About It?
Imagine a hypothetical case: The victim is home alone. The victim makes a video call, and the person on the other end of the call (the witness) is able to watch as the victim locks all of their doors and windows, then the victim settles in on their couch to continue talking on the video call. The witness on the other end of the video call notes when the victim hears their front door unlocking. The victim turns the phone camera towards the front door and the victim and witness on the call both see the interior deadbolt thumb turn rotating into the unlocked position. The victim screams and drops their phone. The witness hangs up and calls the police. When the police show up to the scene where the victim is, they find the front door to the residence locked, then, upon forcing entry into the home, the police find the victim dead, alone.
Even in an investigation that is a perfect fit for a forensic lock assessment (FLA), what is the widespread current state of capabilities and infrastructure in place for an on scene investigator who attempts to have a lock forensically analyzed?
Two active law enforcement investigators were contacted for phone interviews with the author of this paper, and they were both asked the same question “what steps would you take if you had a strong desire to pursue a CMOE forensic investigation of the locks at the scene of a crime, to look for evidence of covert entry, in order to assist you in your investigations.”
Interview #1:
“Nothing,” was their flat answer. The interviewee then followed up by stating that they would be leaning on traditional investigative techniques that would hopefully find, interview, and prosecute the offender.
When asked a second line of questioning “If you were intensely determined to investigate the inside of the lock as a perfect candidate for useful information, what steps could you take next if you were aggressively pursuing a forensic lock assessment?” Their response was “I don’t know. I would call all of the other detectives in my agency, although I don’t think they would know what to do either. I could call the regional crime lab, but honestly, we already avoid sending them items to sample forensically because it takes so much energy and so much time that for many of the crimes we investigate here, the resulting return on our samples that we’ve sent them arrive back to us too slowly for us to do anything about the results” (J.M., active law enforcement officer in CO, phone interview with author, August 13, 2026).
Interview #2:
“No,” was their initial simple answer. When pressed with a second line of questioning, the response was “Even if everything makes perfect sense to suspect CMOE during a burglary or another crime, we would continue traditional investigations methods. Then we’d simply transfer the case to a secondary investigations unit to take over the case. At most, photos might be taken of the door and the lock and latch area and attached to the case file, but that’s it” (G.S., active law enforcement officer in NY, phone interview with author, August 13, 2026).
The responses of these two LEOs are consistent with the author’s approximately 20 years of experience with CMOE and his observations regarding the resources and specialized support available to investigators. Organizational and bureaucratic factors must also be considered. In the author’s experience, novel or highly specialized investigative approaches may encounter institutional resistance, while established “safe” investigative practices are often favored simply because they are familiar and consistent with “the way we’ve always done things.”
Assuming an officer has the interest in an FLA, and has the available time, and supervision support, if an on scene investigator wanted to secure and preserve evidence concerning potential CMOE evidence, the first problem is that most structures have multiple points of entry available, if there are a large number of entry points, or CMOE “attack vectors,” an investigator must determine which attack vectors need to be preserved.
In a perfect scenario, if we assume there is only one door that enters into a single room, which part or parts of the door and lock must be collected? The investigator, without OLF experience, must determine which parts of the door and lock are to be removed from the structure, and how. Then, they have to have the samples sent to their forensics lab, and will notate on the report what services are recommended. Then, if the laboratory does not have persons on staff with CMOE-related capabilities, they can either not perform the assessment and end their involvement, or they can start researching who might be able to help them. If they find someone to help them, they must have the service approved, and might potentially need to approve funding if required. All of these steps take time and energy, and many of these steps require supervision approval.
In contrast, no approval is needed for an investigator to take photos of a scene and to submit those photos to their forensic laboratory; and no approval is needed for an investigator to pull fingerprints from a scene and to send them in for processing. Additionally, even if an investigator wants photos and fingerprints taken from the scene, most agencies have secondary personnel that can be called to the scene to take photos or to pull fingerprints, thus freeing up on scene investigators to spend their time and energy elsewhere instead of spending their time hands-on with evidence collection activities. Institutional infrastructure already exists for traditional forensic investigative routes.
Texas’s Department of Public Safety (DPS) was contacted, and a representative from a regional DPS laboratory was asked “If a patrol officer or detective wanted to send a lock to your Texas DPS Forensic Lab in order to determine if a lock was picked, is that a service that you offer” and the answer was an immediate “no.” In a second line of questioning, asking how an investigator would pursue that avenue of forensic investigation if they were really determined to have a lock assessed forensically for evidence of CMOE, the representative stated “I have no idea. I would have to do some research and get back to you” (D.C., DPS representative in TX, phone interview with author, September 26, 2026). This does not mean that it is impossible for a Texas state LEO (or any state’s LEOs) to have a lock or door forensically assessed for CMOE, but it does paint a clear picture that it is not an established practice and that infrastructure is currently not in place, or easily accessible, for this type of investigative avenue.
The FBI has a publicly accessible pdf document, Handbook of Forensic Services 2019, that provides guidance and procedures for collecting, preserving, packaging, and shipping evidence, and it explains the forensic examinations performed by the FBI’s Laboratory Division (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2019). Nowhere in that 104 page document does it provide any guidance on “locks.” Additionally, if a structure is entered using CMOE, the lock may be completely undisturbed and the latch, the hinges, or other parts of a locking mechanism or adjacent system might have been the target of the physical pick, decode, or bypass. CMOE-specific evidence might be found inside of a lock, on the face of the lock, on the latches, anywhere on a doorframe, or on the hinges, or in a number of other unique places. Not to mention, trace evidence found on scene like dust from brass key filing, or brass chunks left from clipping keys on scene.
Across the landscape for lock related studies, most investigators don’t know what signs they would be looking for on scene that would point to a potential CMOE sign. They wouldn’t know which items to collect and/or how to collect them, package them, and ship them to a laboratory. And supervisors, as well as laboratory personnel, largely report that CMOE forensic assessments are not an established or supported investigative function.
This gap does not have to be overwhelmingly addressed with a large number of newly certified and experienced CMOE forensic lock experts. Merely taking an existing forensic toolmark examiner that is already in a state or federal forensic laboratory and having them attend a short but effective certifications course concerning CMOE evidence, will allow anyone in the state to at least have a representative somewhere within the state’s infrastructure that can be contacted and who can answer questions when investigators submit questions to their forensic laboratory ecosystem.
Gap 4: Laboratory - What is the Current State and Limitations of Laboratory CMOE Forensics Capabilities
Forensic laboratories are set up as secure, controlled environments, stocked with heavy and expensive machinery that is well maintained and calibrated. This allows for obtaining incredibly specific measurements and comparisons across many areas, like fingerprints, blood, chemical, firearms, DNA and other current “traditional” laboratory disciplines. Laboratories can take the time to receive, process, measure, research, and compare all sorts of samples.
While these services and their results are extremely important, and irreplaceable, an on scene investigator can sometimes benefit much more, within the CMOE focus area cases that this paper addresses, by knowing quickly: are there any covert markings within any locking system on scene that are inconsistent with normal use but consistent with CMOE tools and techniques? And: what would those tools look like, how long might that entry have taken, what might the skill level of the intruder be, how loud might that intrusion have been, where might the intruder have ordered their tools from, and what might their digital footprint be if they were researching these specific locks or techniques.
The controlled, secured, laboratory set up, while effective for the current state of traditional laboratory work, can be a limitation that highlights several problems when it comes to forensic CMOE assessments:
It may be unknown which lock/door was accessed via CMOE, if any, and it might be unreasonable to send in every lock from the scene to the laboratory.
Not only do the insides of locks gather CMOE evidence, but the entire door, the frame, and hinges may also collect evidence of CMOE; it may be unreasonable to collect and submit an entire door and frame to a forensic laboratory (or multiple doors).
Small brass filings or clippings, created by filing or clipping keys on scene, may be ignored and otherwise lost or disposed of on scene if they are not immediately recognized and collected.
Sometimes, the act of removing or disassembling locks may impart new additional toolmarks onto locking systems that could skew existing CMOE toolmarks.
The ability for a laboratory to look at a toolmark on a sample and to compare it with a provided suspect tool is amazing. While exceptions exist, the current established practice for toolmarks is to compare a suspected tool with the marks that are left on a sample. The FBI’s 2019 Handbook of Forensic Services manual states that, for general toolmark analysis, a suspecting marking implement should be included so that the assessment can be performed (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2019). While the confirmation that a specific suspect tool was in fact the same tool that engaged in CMOE attempts on scene is incredibly useful for an investigator, there are some limitations that this current service has. What if an investigator does not have any suspected tools found yet, specifically because the investigator has not been able to identify any suspects yet? There are established ways that an Operational Lock Forensic assessment can be performed quickly, on scene, that can give an investigator useful information that can lead them towards identifying potential suspects early on in the investigation, and specific CMOE evidence can also assist an investigator with their lines of questioning when they are interviewing potential suspects (Watson forthcoming).
While the ability for laboratory forensic personnel to assess a sample in their secured and controlled environment at a reasonable pace does provide an advantage in which the technician can ensure that proper documentation is recorded, that machines are well calibrated, that tests are repeated, etc., this extended timeline provides a hindrance to the speed in which investigators on scene need information in the early stages post-crime. Forensic analysis requests must be placed into priority categories in order for technicians to make the best use of their time to match investigative needs. This is especially true for very specific and expensive testing that takes time to process and that locks up equipment that can only be used for one test at a time. An interesting component of FLAs is that valuable and reliable CMOE signs can often be interpreted immediately upon visual inspection of a lock or related locking hardware. This means that a lock that is sent to a laboratory specifically for an FLA would be a waste of precious time when a solution exists to have locks assessed immediately on scene without the use of heavy, expensive, controlled laboratory equipment.
Imagine someone with “combat tracking” skills who is operating as a solo operator in a snowy landscape, in a foreign and unfriendly country. If they leave their remote cabin in the morning to go collect food and water and then come back to their cabin later and they see military combat bootprints in the snow that are leading into their cabin, an appropriate response would not be to stop, to pour a cast onto the bootprints in order to send the cast off for laboratory forensic testing. What the operator needs to know right now is “there are footprints” and “danger!” This does not mean that follow-on laboratory analysis isn’t helpful. On the contrary, a follow up forensic assessment could be immensely helpful, but it shouldn’t come before solving the problem at hand.
Many government operators are trained in the skillset of “Combat Tracking.” This is a skill where operators are taught to visually assess things like footprints and to be able to perform a snap-assessment, very quickly, to determine how the footprints might have been made, who might have made them, how tall or heavy the person might have been, how many people there might have been, and how old the tracks might be, and more. While follow-on forensic assessments of footprints that are photographed or casted on scene could be immensely useful, the skill of combat tracking that is taught and certified is a skill that is designed to be used in the field because that is where the signs, the footprints, exist and that is the type of information and the location where the operators/investigators can benefit the most from what combat tracking provides.
The same type of on scene evidence, the same immediate need for information, and the same type of information that can be obtained on scene exists within the world of Operational Lock Forensics (OLF).
To compare the well established certification and skill of combat tracking with OLF:
“Did someone walk through here?” = “Did someone try to pick this lock?”
“What is background noise and what is a sign of enemy action?” = “What are signs of normal use and what are the signs of CMOE?”
“What might this person’s travel have looked like?” = “What might the application of this technique on this look have looked like?”
“What type of capabilities might this person have had?” = “What level of capabilities might this intruder have had?”
And much more.
If an investigator on scene can have these questions answered quickly, that could have an extremely beneficial impact on the speed at which a suspect is identified, and the likelihood that a prosecution is successful. And, if a suspect is detained and/or prosecuted quickly enough, this CMOE related information can help to prevent the criminal from victimizing other innocent persons and property.
The CMOE problem exists on scene, in the field. It is better to have a forensic lock specialist in the field ruling out which doors and locks don’t need to be assessed. It makes more sense for the lock specialist to be the one to disassemble the locks of interest and to assess them quickly, in the field. It makes more sense to pull as much specific information from locks, doors, and doorframes, and other related hardware, on scene, rather than hoping that the right samples were sent to the lab, waiting, hoping that additional irrelevant forensic toolmark evidence was not accidentally imparted onto any samples, etc. This is not to say that laboratories are not useful, as forensic laboratories are irreplaceable and they perform incredible and necessary work that they are especially set up to solve.
Even in the 1998 Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines. Part II., the FBI states:
13-13.2.7 Lock and Key Examinations. (1) The purpose of a lock examination is to determine, if possible, if toolmarks are present that indicate attempts were made to pick the lock, or if some type of tool or instrument was used to force the lock. When such a request is made, only the lock or those parts of the lock which have visible toolmarks on them should be submitted. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1998, 13-119).
If an investigator is unfamiliar with CMOE, and if they are interested in a FLA because they don’t know if a lock has been picked or not because CMOE evidence is inherently non-visible or extremely slight, how can an investigator only submit those parts of the lock which have visible toolmarks on them?
Additionally, the following page in that document states:
“If there are questions about the operation of a particular style lock, consideration should be given to contacting a local locksmith with those questions.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1998, 13-120)
Locks and keys, and the evidence of CMOE, can be tricky. And even the FBI’s crime lab has issued this guidance (although dated) that you need someone on scene to help solve these unique problems.
While the solution to the procedure gap in the last subchapter of this paper recommends putting at least one lock specialist into each state’s state-level forensic laboratory, the solution might not be to set up the laboratories themselves so that they can receive physical lock samples. The best solution that can assist in the field, in order to address the large number of entry points that need to be assessed, and to visually check on scene these large doors and doorframes, and to be able to rule out as many door as possible, and to ensure locks and keys are assembled and disassembled properly, should be to set up a deployable specialist that can travel to crime scenes and who can manage calls within a region. This would be a win-win to have a liaison who can make the most of the relationship between the field and the lab. The U.S. does not need a brigade of 3,000 to 5,000 qualified Operational Lock Forensic specialists deploying across the country. But, to place one or two OLF qualified personnel within each of the 50 states would provide an overwhelming impact on this unique crime trend that is currently not known about, not tracked under UCR, and difficult to spot its evidence and to process when it does take place during crimes.
Gap 5: Training - Problems and Solutions
On the operational side of American law enforcement, government, and military investigations, there is not an epidemic of being overstaffed and underworked. One of the common problems that all tactical officers and all investigators face is their agency’s economic decisions surrounding how much training each individual officer/investigator receives. Every organization has a training budget that restricts the training that an investigator can receive. Even if the training is free (or if the organization otherwise has more than enough of a training budget) it is difficult to take an investigator away from active investigations for any length of time in order to attend training.
Does training provide certification? Does certification equal proficiency? If multiple courses are available at different time lengths, different intensities, and different costs, which courses are more likely than others to be approved by commands? What if a long and expensive course provides adequate proficiency, and a short and inexpensive course provides a minimum level of certification but merely introduces investigators to a new concept, leaving investigators unable to act independently with their new skill set in the field? Acquiring training and certifications requires more than just a surface level of research to find the right training provider.
Much of American government operations requires operators to spend only a limited number of years at a single unit before it is mandated that they be sent to another unit, even if everyone is otherwise happy with them remaining at their present unit. There is a strange bureaucratic phenomenon in almost all American government operations where an operator/investigator arrives at a new operational unit, they might receive some initial “pipeline” training before or upon arrival, then they are quickly deemed “too new” to be sent to additional certification or training courses. After some experience and maybe one or two specialized courses that eventually get approved, they might become specialized within a unit which means that the only approval they can receive for new training has to match their specialty. Eventually, once an operator or investigator is in their prime at their current unit, they become “too short” in their remaining stay at the unit so they are then prohibited from attending additional training courses since they will be leaving their unit soon. There are, of course, exceptions.
If forensic personnel, or investigators, want to attempt to train themselves to get started, to learn about lock-related forensics via published books, the selection of available published books are few. For current open source information regarding “lock forensics,” the forensics of locks and related hardware for FLAs, there are only a few books that only touch on concepts regarding lock forensics, and they all approach CMOE-related forensic content differently.
Werkzeugspur by Göth.
The German “Werkzeugspur” translates to “tool marks.” This 1999 hardcover, 324 page book is published in Germany, in the German language. Göth brings a deep foundation of the wide field of toolmarks to the reader. It does have photos but they are small on the page, they are slightly grainy, they are dated, and they are in black and white. This book discusses lock forensics in chapter 19, pages 252-276; safes in chapter 20, pages 276-283, and keys in chapter 21, pages 284-305. That’s 31 pages of locks and keys, and 21 pages on safes.
Impressioning by Diederichsen.
This 2007 hardcover is also published in Germany, but is available in an English translation. Diederichsen has put together a fine book concerning some great concepts for how to “impression” a key; impressioning is a technique by which someone can obtain covert entry into a space. Concerning forensics, chapter 5 “Forensic investigation of profile cylinders which were overcome by impressioning Forensic investigation laboratory GÖTH” was authored by Göth, making up pages 90-105. This 15 page chapter does have large, clear, color photos.
Color Atlas of Forensic Toolmark Identification by Petraco.
This hardcover was published in 2011, totaling 159 pages. This book discusses the science of toolmarks, covering things like: how light works, how to measure small marks, how to choose the right camera and lens, etc. There are 9 photos, with only a small amount of text per photo, that show pins and other lock hardware relating to CMOE.
Locks, Safes, and Security (Second Edition) by Tobias.
This hardcover, first edition published in 1971, second edition published in 2011, spans a two volume set that totals 1411 pages. This book contains four chapters that directly relate to lock forensics Chapters 24-27, pages 447-533, totaling 86 pages of forensic lock content. There are only a few photos which are grainy and black and white, but Tobias is a wealth of knowledge when it comes to a deep encyclopedic knowledge of locks, lock picking, and related studies.
Tobias on Locks and Insecurity Engineering by Tobias.
This 679 page hardcover, published in 2024, has two pages (45-46), text-only, that discuss the forensics of lock picking and it is explained within the primary framing of insurance claims and manufacturer lawsuits.
Operational Lock Forensics by Watson.
This hardcover, 308 page book, publishing forthcoming, is entirely dedicated to lock forensics. Photos and illustrations are on almost every page, large, and in color. It is primarily designed so that special forces and special operations personnel can quickly discover, identify, and analyze the forensics of covert entry when it comes to locks and locking systems. (Because the author has a financial interest in this publication, that relationship is disclosed here and more fully in the Conflict of Interest Disclosure at the end of this paper.)
Image above: Some of the few available printed books that touch on toolmark forensics and/or lock forensics.
If an investigator is looking for a reference website, https://lockpickingforensics.com/ is run by Datagram, and it has some good introductory text and photos that help to show different lock mechanisms and their post-CMOE state. Datagram also has an informative talk on lock forensics that can be found on YouTube under the title “DataGram - Forensic Locksmithing.” The reader is encouraged to attempt to find other reference websites and other YouTube videos discussing the nuance of lock forensics. In the author’s experience, resources are sparse.
The Investigative Association of Investigative Locksmiths (IAIL), a division of ALOA, lists a Certified Forensic Locksmith (CFL) certification on their website, but, in order to test for that certification, IAIL states that prior to requesting to take the test to certify as a CFL, the following requirements must be strictly adhered to:
The applicant must be an IAIL/ALOA paid member in good standing for at least the last year.
Must have attended and passed the IAIL Course: Investigative Locksmithing I, & II
…and the IAIL - Auto theft and arson forensic
…and the IAIL - Forensic report writing
…and the IAIL - Forensic Case Management
…and the IAIL - Expert Witness
…and the IAIL - Photography
Must prove 75 associated credit points
Must write and submit an article for the ALOA magazine (ALOA 2026)
Concerning this ALOA/IAIL course/certification, an interview with two CFLs on Engaging Experts explains that a CFL (while forensics and locksmith are in the person’s job title) may spend their entire career focusing on supporting civil suit cases involving automatic door opening devices - to detect whether or not the door and lock hardware were installed and maintained properly; which means that a CFL is not necessarily someone who is on the cutting edge of understanding the nuances of CMOE when it comes to criminal investigations or intelligence operations (Round Table Group 2025). If an agency is interested in sending an investigator to a course, the title of the course alone is not a sufficient indicator of the value of the course to the investigator, or the correct matching of the needs of the investigator.
Getting the right type of training to the right type of investigators, concerning lock forensics, is not a difficult problem to solve, but it does require more than cursory research on an internet search engine. Investigators need access to a course and information designed for their specific needs, and not designed for the needs of someone studying automatic-door-opening for civil suits, like a CFL. There aren’t a lot of books, content, or courses concerning lock forensics, but they do exist. And, in order to help the larger landscape of investigations nation-wide, supervisors need to understand the value of losing an investigator to three days of off-site training, for the benefit of the incredible amount of time saving and investigative capability increases that a well-trained investigator can leverage into their operations.
On Scene Considerations
Even if a locking system was accessed via CMOE, the evidence inside the lock may very well be completely irrelevant to the investigation. If the first, or primary investigator on scene believes that the likelihood of identifying a suspect and prosecuting the suspect is even moderately likely, this correctly moves a Forensic Lock Assessment (FLA) further down the list of necessary steps to take. If the primary investigator (or any other follow-on investigator) doesn’t have any idea who the suspect might be, and doesn’t have any statements, video evidence, fingerprints, blood, DNA, or any other potentially identifying evidence, this moves a potential FLA much higher up on the list of steps to take. Additionally, if investigators aren’t sure how the suspect might have gotten in, or If there is any doubt as to whether the structure in question was locked or not (even if potential victims aren’t sure whether a crime has been committed or not) an assessment of locks and hardware might be beneficial here.
Things that might make a CMOE forensic assessment less necessary:
A suspect, or multiple suspects, has already been identified.
Other forensic information exists that is likely to lead to a suspect identity (hair, blood, fingerprints, etc.).
Destructive entry is identified at all relevant entry points within the structure where criminal action has occurred.
The impact of the crime is exceedingly low for the victim.
Things that might make a CMOE forensic assessment more necessary:
A suspect has not yet been identified.
No other forensic evidence exists that could lead to a suspect ID.
Nobody witnessed the crime in action.
Nobody witnessed the entry in action.
Someone witnessed the entry, and actions were witnessed that might be described as odd or unusual - that could match CMOE attempts.
Someone was clearly inside the structure but it is unknown if a crime has occurred.
Door or window is found unlocked.
Victim is unsure of whether they left the structure locked or not.
Victim is sure they left the structure locked.
If lock picking tools are found on the scene.
If small brass filings or clippings are found on scene.
In Confessions of a Master Jewel Thief, Bill Mason states that a practice that he engaged in was to enter into a structure (non-destructively) and make his way directly to the master bedroom and lock the master bedroom door behind him. Then, he would only take only some of the jewels from the bedroom and leave, still using non-destructive means. This would result in victims, usually a husband and wife, arguing over who locked the bedroom door, and leaving them potentially not discovering the theft for days or weeks, or ever (Mason 2003). So, even if a victim calls investigators and they think someone may have been inside their structure but they’re not sure if a crime occurred, or to what extent a crime might have occurred, this is a perfect time to start the ball rolling on a CMOE-related lock forensic assessment.
If the time-delay from when the crime was committed and when investigators arrive on scene is a short time gap, investigators might want to check any field interviews, or other arrest reports that occurred in the area, looking for stolen goods or looking for lock picking tools found on suspects or arrestees. This could have a huge beneficial impact on interviews with potential suspects. If lock picking tools are discovered on nearby persons of interest, or on arrestees, those tools can be processed forensically as well, and other follow-on traditional forensic tests can be honed in on with more focus.
Another powerful tactic to consider is: if a suspicious person is encountered by law enforcement, and the person is found to have a wide array of professional entry tools, even if no crimes are reported in the area, and if no crime is technically committed by the suspicious person, law enforcement in the area might want to proactively knock on some doors in the area and to have residents ensure that nothing is missing from their homes or businesses. If a crime trend is then discovered, then an FLA could point you straight to prime suspect #1.
Even if the primary investigator does not possess forensic skills on scene to look for CMOE evidence, they can ask questions to themselves, or victims/witnesses, to determine if any clues on scene support the possibility of CMOE and if the overall impact of the case would warrant calling someone who is familiar with lock forensics. If CMOE is considered possible at all, at a minimum it should be documented in the initial/primary investigator’s official report. It is also good practice to contact supervision and follow-on investigators regarding possible CMOE.
Discussion
While it is not likely that the field of Operational Lock Forensics will possess a footprint as large as something like fingerprint analysis, or blood spatter analysis, it would not be accurate to say that this field has no value.
There is a non-zero number of crimes that have gone unsolved, or unprosecuted, where CMOE evidence could have sped up the identification of a suspect or could have secured a prosecution that otherwise did not occur. Without the field of lock forensics gaining a wider foothold with investigators, and with crime labs, this will continue to happen. And, while most cases are able to be solved with traditional investigative techniques and traditional forensics support, there is no way for anyone to say exactly how prevalent lock picking related crimes (including unsolved murders) have been, since lock picking as a method of entry is rarely looked for on scene, rarely assessed in laboratories, and is not tracked in Uniform Crime Reporting statistics in the U.S.
Pushing this specialized field of study into a wider acceptance and a wider practice is not a heavy logistical lift, as every new investigator that is certified in this will have a wider effect than merely “plus one” for the field. The mindset shift is probably the more difficult hurdle that needs to be jumped. If things have been working the way they have been working for a long time, modern bureaucracies are unlikely to change course. If, however, an event were to occur where lock forensics were to play a large role, and were to be publicized in a way that is exciting, it is likely that the investigative community would see a huge shift in rapid time. It is an unfortunate but widely repeated phrase in law enforcement and military culture that “it doesn’t matter how good an idea is, it will take someone dying in order for the new idea to finally be acknowledged and acted upon.”
Conclusion
One of the most famous lock pickers in history, Alfred C. Hobbs, explains in his book, Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, that criminals have been picking locks basically as long as there have been locks, “Rogues are very keen in their profession, and know already much more than we can teach them respecting their several kinds of roguery. Rogues knew a good deal about lock-picking long before locksmiths discussed it among themselves” (Hobbs 1853). With lock picking as a method of entry for modern American crimes not being tracked under UCR, it is impossible to say how far behind the curve American investigators are.
Image above: An original 1853 printing of Hobbs’ Rudimentary Treaties on the Construction of Locks, the highlighting is digitally applied, not marked on the physical book.
Dr. Daniel King describes a time in modern civilized history, relating to crime and courtroom trials, where forensic sciences were not widely used or recognized in modern courts, and that the Sherlock Holmes publications served to make forensic sciences popular in the public realm, thus assisting greatly in the acceptance of more forensic studies into modern courtrooms, near the late 1800’s and early 1900’s (King 2020). The phrase “it takes a long time to turn a cargo ship” is often used when describing how willing large bureaucracies are to accept and implement changes. There was a time before fingerprinting was a reliable method for identifying crime suspects. In the U.S., we now exist in the timeline before lock forensics are an established and supported function for any investigations, especially the focus area investigations that this paper is addressing.
Signs of CMOE are difficult to detect without training and experience. The lock forensic gaps pointed out in this paper are slowing down the solving of and in some cases potentially preventing the solving of at least a select number of crimes.
It is not an arduous process to onboard this skill to investigators. Unlike ALOA and IAIL, which require multiple years and multiple courses before someone can request Certified Forensic Locksmith (CFL) training and testing, Operational Lock Forensics (OLF) is one course option for investigators that provides training and certification, with very little prerequisites required, in courses that can be as little as two days long.
Investigators do not need to become world-class experts in order to be able to look at an item and to say “an entry tool probably made that mark.” And the value of CMOE evidence is that it can provide a likely confirmation that CMOE has occurred, what the tools and techniques were that were likely used, what the tools look like and what they cost, what skill level the attacker might have had, how long the attack might have taken, how loud the attack might have been, and even what internet data would be present for a suspect involved in acquiring said tools and in learning about or practicing said techniques, and more.
Finally, the investigative culture needs a change, to start to recognize that the absence of signs of destructive entry is not a confirmation that unauthorized entry has not occurred; that the discovery of an unlocked door, post-crime, does not mean that the victim has left the door unlocked; and that a lone deceased victim found within a locked room is not a confirmation that the door was locked from the inside. And, avenues exist for shoring up these investigative gaps.
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Watson, Pat. Forthcoming. Operational Lock Forensics. UTAC Publishing.
Conflict of Interest Disclosure
The author is the owner of Uncensored Tactical LLC (which provides training courses on Operational Lock Forensics) and the operator of UTAC Publishing (which is the publisher of the book Operational Lock Forensics), both of which are discussed and cited in this paper. The author may receive financial benefit from sales of this publication and from related training and certification courses. The book and course are included in this paper because their subject matter directly addresses covert methods of entry and their investigative recognition. Readers should consider this financial and professional interest when evaluating the author's characterization of the work.
A.I. Disclosure
OpenAI’s ChatGPT (GPT-5.6 Sol) was limited to assisting with the initial organization of the author’s original concepts into an appropriate research-style outline, identifying potential sources for further review by the author, and providing guidance on the proper formatting of citations and reference entries.
No AI-generated writing or editing was used in the text of this paper. All substantive content, analysis, conclusions, and written language are the author’s own.
About the Author
Pat Watson is an author, instructor, and subject-matter expert specializing in operational non-destructive entry, tactical lock picking, and lock forensics. He is the owner and lead instructor of Uncensored Tactical (UTAC), where he develops and teaches specialized entry curricula for military, law-enforcement, and government personnel, including members of U.S. and allied special operations forces. Watson is the author of multiple technical works addressing lock picking and related entry methods, rapid safe openings, key generation, and operational lock forensics.
His professional background includes more than a decade of U.S. Coast Guard service, including service with Tactical Law Enforcement Team South conducting international counter-narcotics operations and participation in counter-piracy operations with Combined Task Force 151 off the coast of Somalia. He subsequently served for multiple years as a local law-enforcement officer in Florida, where his duties included applying unconventional-entry skills in operational settings. His teachings, research, and writing focus on translating specialized entry knowledge into practical frameworks for operators and investigators, with particular emphasis on the recognition, documentation, and interpretation of covert methods of entry.
Author: Pat Watson
Affiliation: Uncensored Tactical LLC, Texas, USA
Article Type: Technical White Paper - Not Peer Reviewed
UTAC NDE White Paper Number: UTAC2026-002
Link to download a pdf of this paper:
Publication Date: September 30th, 2026
Version: V1
Last Edited On: September 30th, 2026
Suggested Citation: Watson, Pat. 2026. “Lock Picking as an Investigative Blind Spot.” UTAC2026-002. Tactical Lock Picking. September 30, 2026. https://www.tacticallockpicking.io/nde-white-paper/utac2026-002.
Keywords: covert methods of entry (CMOE); lock forensics; lock picking; non-destructive entry (NDE); forensic locksmithing; burglary investigation; physical security; crime scene investigation; toolmark examination; forensic science; absence of forced entry.
